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FALSE CLAIMS ACT: INCENTIVIZING INTEGRITY FOR 150 
YEARS FOR ROGUES, PRIVATEERS, PARASITES AND 
PATRIOTS 
James B. Helmer, Jr.∗ 
The Federal Government buys hundreds of billions of dollars worth 
of goods and services each year.  Such purchases are typically made 
pursuant to written agreements with specific terms and conditions often 
supplied by regulations called out by a number in the agreement.  But 
the government does not always get its bargain.  Goods are delivered of 
lesser quality then agreed upon or not delivered at all.  Services, if 
performed, may not be done as specified.  In such a case the United 
States has been cheated. 
Cheating the government has been historically wide-spread, has 
endangered lives, and has even put the future of the nation at risk.  
Catching and preventing government contract thieves is difficult, 
expensive, and often unsuccessful. 
Many Congresses have wrestled with how best to protect the public 
finances.  Should nefarious contractors be court-martialed as war 
criminals?  How can the citizens be confident the executive branch is 
pursuing and prosecuting those who would steal from the public?  What 
is the best way to catch those contract cheaters? 
In colorful language one court describes the answer as “Congress has 
let loose a posse of ad hoc deputies to uncover and prosecute frauds 
against the government.  [Defendants] may prefer the dignity of being 
chased only by the regular troops; if so, they must seek relief from 
Congress.”1  Because of the wild successes of the posse of ad hoc 
deputies, it is unlikely Congress will be providing relief anytime soon to 
those who cheat the government. 
This article will review the history of the Federal False Claims Act.  
The False Claims Act was originally enacted in 1863 and has become 
the primary tool by which the federal treasury is now protected.2  
 
 ∗ B.A. with honors, Denison University, J.D., University of Cincinnati College of Law.  The 
author is Senior Partner and President of Helmer, Martins, Rice & Popham Co., L.P.A. in Cincinnati, 
Ohio.  He has prosecuted qui tam cases for more years than any attorney in America and has obtained 
several record recoveries.  His testimony before Congress helped shape the 1986, 2009, and 2010 
amendments to the False Claims Act.  He argued the Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders 
case before the Supreme Court of the United States.  He has obtained several multi-million dollar jury 
verdicts and has been trial counsel in over 300 published legal decisions including over 100 dealing with 
the False Claims Act.  In 2012, he received the University of Cincinnati Law Review Distinguished 
Alumni Award.  The author can be reached at www.fcalawfirm.com. 
 1. United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 961 F.2d 46, 49 
(4th Cir. 1992). 
 2. United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 302 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g denied, 
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Indeed, it has proven so successful that its tenets have been adopted by 
numerous states3 and have served as the basis for numerous government 
reforms of statutes dealing with income tax cheating4 and securities law 
violations.5  The overriding theme of the False Claims Act is virtually to 
deputize an army of insiders to uncover, inform, and pursue those 
government contractors who knowingly cheat in their agreements with 
the government.  Such persons are called “relators.”  If a relator’s efforts 
are successful in returning money to the United States, the law provides 
for generous rewards and protections for the relator and stiff penalties 
and disgorgement of gains by the offending contractors. 
I. ORIGINS OF THE POSSE 
As we will see, the False Claims Act originated from war-time 
necessity.  But the concept of enlisting members of the public to protect 
the King’s property is actually hundreds of years old.  Such actions have 
been traced to as early as 1335.6 
Such suits are called qui tam actions because they are brought by a 
person qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur, 
that is, “[w]ho sues on behalf of the king as well as for himself.”7 
Qui tam actions were common in England.  They were often based on 
a private citizen’s statutory right to share in the Government’s recovery 
from wrongdoers.  By the 14th century “[m]uch reliance was placed on 
common informers to secure the enforcement of laws effecting public 
order and safety.”8 
 
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1275 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). 
 3. JAMES B. HELMER, JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION, ch. 22 § I 
(BNA/Bloomberg, 6th ed. 2012). 
 4. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 enacted significant changes in the IRS award 
program for whistleblowers.  26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2006).  Since 1867, Congress had provided that rewards 
in the discretion of the Secretary could be made to those detecting and bringing to trial persons guilty of 
violating internal revenue laws.  Before 2006, such awards were discretionary and IRS policy 
determined the amount.  Now, 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2006) establishes the conditions that qualify a 
whistleblower to an award.  These requirements generally require that $2 million must be in dispute.  
There are no qui tam provisions for allowing the whistleblower to participate in the prosecution after 
making his tip to the IRS.  In fact, because of the confidentiality laws regarding taxes, the whistleblower 
is largely kept in the dark. 
 5. Section 922 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010), amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78(a) by adding Section 21F, entitled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.”  While 
this is not a qui tam provision permitting whistleblower participation it does provide for rewards to 
whistleblowers whose voluntary original information leads to successful enforcement actions by the 
Commission. 
 6. 9 Edward III ch. 1 (1335). 
 7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United 
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000). 
 8. LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/3
2013] FALSE CLAIMS ACT: INCENTIVIZING INTEGRITY 1263 
The English statutes gave forfeitures 
[a]t large to any common informer; or in other words, to any such person 
or persons as will sue for the same: and hence such actions are called 
popular actions, because they are given to the people in general.  
Sometimes one part [of the recovery] is given to the king, to the poor, or 
to some public use, and the other part to the informer or prosecutor: and 
then the suit is called a qui tam action . . . .9 
The English tradition of qui tam provisions continued into the Anglo-
American system of law.  In fact, the first Continental Congress of the 
United States (which included several members who later drafted the 
United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights) enacted several 
statutes containing qui tam provisions.10  Of the fourteen penalty statutes 
enacted by the First Congress, between ten and twelve authorized qui 
tam suits.11  Other early Congresses continued this tradition so that by 
1805 “[a]lmost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be 
recovered by an action of debt [i.e., by a qui tam relator] as well as by 
information [by a public prosecutor].”12  In fact, the landmark decision 
 
FROM 1750 143 (1948). 
 9. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161–62 (George 
Sharswood ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1889). 
 10. See Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 341 (1805) (“Almost every fine or forfeiture under a penal 
statute, may be recovered by an action of debt [by a qui tam relator] as well as by information [by a 
public prosecutor].”).  It is therefore doubtful that the framers of the Constitution believed qui tam suits 
to be unconstitutional under any provision of the Constitution. 
 11. United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 and n.2 
(C.D. Cal. 1989), perm. app. denied, No. 89-80201 (9th Cir. July 31, 1989). 
 12. See Woods, 6 U.S. at 341.  The First Congress passed several statutes allowing injured 
parties to sue for damages on both their own and the United States’ behalf.  See Act of May 31, 1790, 
ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124–25 (allowing author or proprietor to sue for and receive half of penalty for 
violation of copyright); cf. Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 6, 1 Stat. 103 (allowing census taker to sue for 
and receive half of penalty for failure to cooperate in census); Act of July 5, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 
129 (extending same to Rhode Island); see also, Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 102 (allowing 
informer to sue for, and receive half of fine for, failure to file census return); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 
29, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131–33 (allowing private individual to sue for, and receive half of fine for, carriage 
of seaman without contract or illegal harboring of runaway seamen); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 
Stat. 137–38 (allowing private individual to sue for, and receive half of goods forfeited for, unlicensed 
trading with Indian tribes); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 209 (allowing person who discovers 
violation of spirits duties, or officer who seizes contraband spirits, to sue for and receive half of penalty 
and forfeiture, along with costs, in action of debt); cf. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 16, 17, 1 Stat. 116 
(allowing informer to conduct prosecution, and receive half of fine, for criminal larceny or receipt of 
stolen goods).  Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 44–45 (giving informer full penalty paid by 
customs official for failing to post fee schedule); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 55, 1 Stat. 173; Act of 
July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 38, 1 Stat. 48 (giving informer quarter of penalties, fines and forfeitures 
authorized under a customs law); Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21, 1 Stat. 60 (same under a maritime 
law); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 69, 1 Stat. 177 (same under another customs law); Act of Sep. 2, 
1789, ch. 12, § 8, 1 Stat. 67 (providing informer half of penalty upon conviction for violation of 
conflict-of-interest and bribery provisions in Act establishing treasury Department); Act of Mar. 3, 
1791, ch. 38, § 1, 1 Stat. 215 (extending same to additional Treasury employees); Act of Feb. 25, 1791, 
ch. 10, §§ 8, 9, 1 Stat. 195, 196 (providing informer half or fifth of fines resulting from improper trading 
3
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establishing the authority of the American courts, McCulloch v. 
Maryland,13 was itself based on a qui tam action.14 
Eventually all of these early qui tam statutes would be repealed.15  
But the English concept of enlisting persons to seek recovery for their 
government and rewarding them for so doing had made it to American 
shores.16 
II. CIVIL WAR ORIGIN OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: ENLISTING A ROGUE 
TO CATCH A ROGUE 
At the same time that the Union Army was suffering defeat after 
bloody defeat from rebel forces the Congress was receiving alarming 
reports of misappropriation of money supposedly spent to aid the war 
effort.  Such reports included: 
• The same mules being sold over and over again to Army 
quartermasters.17 
• Rotted ship hulls freshly painted to appear new then sold as new 
vessels to the NAVY.18 
• Infantry boots made of cardboard which wore out after a mile of 
marching.19 
• Uniform cloth made from recycled rags, which disintegrated 
when it became wet.20 
 
or lending by agents of Bank of United States); cf. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 4, 1 Stat. 153 
(apportioning half of penalty for failing to deposit ship manifest to official who should have received 
manifest, and half to collector in port of destination). 
 13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 14. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 537 (1832) (discussing McCullough v. Maryland). 
 15. In addition to the False Claims Act, there are three other qui tam statutes in the federal code: 
46 U.S.C. § 80103 (1988) (forfeiture of vessels taking undersea treasure from the Florida coast to 
foreign nations); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 203 (current version at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 292(b)(1988)) (false making of patented articles) (revised Sept. 16, 2011 to eliminate the qui tam 
provisions); Act of June 30, 1884, Ch. 161, § 27, 4 Stat. 729, 733–34 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 201 
(1988)) (regulating Indian trade). 
 16. The long tradition of qui tam actions in both England and the American colonies would 
prove to be “particularly relevant” when the United States Supreme Court in 2000 determined such 
actions to be constitutional.  Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 529 U.S. 765, 
774 (2000). 
 17. 132 Cong. Rec. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman). 
 18. WAYNE ANDREWS, THE VANDERBILT LEGEND 77–84 (1941). 
 19. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955 (1863). 
 20. Shoddy cloth was made from recycled rags.  When the Civil War started Brooks Brothers 
glued together shredded, often decaying rags, and pressed them into a semblance of cloth.  Uniforms 
were then made from this result, which would literally melt on soldiers wearing them in the first 
rainstorm.  Ron Soodalter, The Union’s ‘Shoddy Aristocracy’, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (May 9, 2011), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/the-unions-shoddy-aristocracy; CLINT JOHNSON, A 
VAST AND FIENDISH PLOT: THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK ON NEW YORK CITY 77 (Citadel 2010); 
BARNET SCHECTER, THE DEVIL’S OWN WORK: THE CIVIL WAR DRAFT RIOTS AND THE FIGHT TO 
RECONSTRUCT AMERICA 17 (Walker & Co. 2007); Shoddy Army Contracts, SACRAMENTO DAILY 
4
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• Gunpowder barrels that when opened contained sawdust.21 
Such reports led Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts to introduce 
on January 16, 1863, Senate Bill 467 “to prevent and punish frauds upon 
the Government of the United States.”22  Senator Wilson summarized 
the need to act: 
[T]hese Halls have rung with denunciations of the frauds of contractors 
upon the Government of the United States.  Investigating committees in 
both Houses of Congress have reported the grossest frauds upon the 
Government.  The Government is doing what it can to stop these frauds 
and punish the persons who commit them.  The Government finds 
however, that it has no law adequate to punish them . . . [T]he War 
Department says there is now no law adequate to meet these cases of 
fraud upon the Government.  This bill is reported for the purpose of 
ferreting out and punishing these enormous frauds upon our Government; 
and, for one, my sympathies are with the Government, and not with the 
men who are committing these frauds.  We have all of us seen enough, 
since this rebellion broke out, of frauds perpetrated upon the Government, 
and above all, and more than all, perpetrated upon our soldiers in the 
field; and I trust that the Senate will pass this bill, or some bill that will 
put fraudulent contractors in a position where they may be punished for 
their frauds.23 
The bill moved quickly through the Senate with stirring words of 
support: 
It is one of the crying evils of the period, if report is in any degree to be 
credited, that our Treasury is plundered from day to day by bands of 
conspirators, who are knotted together in this city and other large cities 
for the purpose of defrauding and plundering the Government.24 
 . . . .  
I do not think that there is any class of culprits who deserve more certain 
and speedy punishment then many of the classes of persons who are 
provided for, or attempted to be provided for, in this bill, and who have 
failed to perform their duties in the execution of contracts made with the 
Government.25 
The concept of paying a 50% reward of the amount recovered was seen 
as a strong temptation to get conspirators to turn on each other: 
 
UNION, Sept. 27, 1861, at 4. (“Garments furnished [to Union soldiers] have literally resolved themselves 
into their original elements within a week after being put on by the soldier.”). 
 21. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955 (1863). 
 22. Id. at 348 (statement of Sen. Wilson). 
 23. Id. at 956. 
 24. Id. at 955 (statement of Sen. Howard). 
 25. Id. at 956 (statement of Sen. Davis). 
5
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The bill offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court 
and betrays his co-conspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to that 
class.  Even the district attorney, who is required to be vigilant in the 
prosecution of such cases, may be also the informer, and entitled himself 
to one half the forfeiture under the qui tam clause, and to one half of the 
double damages which may be recovered against the person committing 
the act.  In short, sir, I have based the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh 
sections upon the old-fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and 
‘setting a rogue to catch a rogue,’ which is the safest and most 
expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.26 
Congress held spirited debates about what to do about such 
shenanigans.  Making such conduct a crime was easy.  But Congress 
wanted to go further.  Thus, adding qui tam provisions to a civil/criminal 
False Claims Act was decided as appropriate.27  The civil False Claims 
Act allowed anyone—including U.S. Attorneys—to bring an action on 
behalf of the United States against a government contractor who 
knowingly submitted false claims for payment to the Government.  If 
the suit was successful the offending contractor was required to pay 
double damages and a $2,000 per false claim penalty.  The successful 
relator would receive 50% of the amount recovered.  Thus, the concept 
was to make the United States whole even after the 50% reward was 
paid. 
The Senate version was passed and forwarded to the House on 
February 16, 1863.  The House made a single amendment concerning 
the criminal penalty.  When returned to the Senate for approval it was 
promptly passed.  The False Claims Act was sent to President Lincoln 
who signed it the same day, March 2, 1863.28 
There are few reported qui tam cases after President Lincoln signed 
 
 26. Id. at 955–56 (statement of Sen. Howard).  Senator Howard’s remarks about the district 
attorney qualifying for a reward often echo today given the Department of Justice’s long crusade to 
prevent government employees from bringing qui tam suits.  See HELMER, supra note 3, at ch. 1, 
§ IV(C). 
 27. Making such an offense a court martial matter was rejected.  CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 
3RD SESS. 956.  As Senator Davis remarked:  
I then came to the conclusion that forces, soldiers, troops, armed men, and not the 
followers of an army, are subject to military law and military courts; that it is only men 
of war who are to be tried by that stern code, and by men whose rule is arbitrary power 
and implicit obedience rather than the just principals of law. 
Id. 
 28. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.  The False Claims Act was reenacted as §§ 3490–
94 of the Revised Statutes with the criminal provisions moved to another location.  U.S. Rev. Stat. Tit. 
36, § 3490–94 (1875) (civil) and § 5438 of the Revised Statutes, U.S. Rev. Stat. Tit. 70, § 5438 (1875) 
(criminal).  The Civil False Claims Act was later codified under § 231–35 (1976), and finally recodified 
in 1982 under §§ 3729–31 of Title 31 of the United States Code, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–31 (1982).  
President Lincoln also signed the “Military Conscription Act” for drafting military men this same week 
on Mar. 3, 1863. 
6
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the 1863 original version of the False Claims Act.  One case 
demonstrated that the private citizen alone prosecuted the action and the 
Government had no right to intervene or to void or preempt the relator’s 
vested right in the outcome of the lawsuit.29  But no such action could be 
discontinued without written consent of the United States District 
Attorney and the Court.30  
The original False Claims Act worked very well.  As noted by one 
court in 1885: 
[The False Claims Act] is intended to protect the treasury against the 
hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and 
should be construed accordingly.  It was passed upon the theory . . . that 
one of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds 
on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by 
private persons acting . . . under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or 
the hope of gain.  Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with 
the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going 
public vessel.31 
III. PARASITIC LAWSUITS NEARLY END THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
Unleashing a posse of rogues and enterprising privateers was one 
thing.  But encouraging an army of parasites did not sit well with 
Congress. 
As a result of WWII, a whole new class of war profiteers surfaced.  
But unlike 1863, by 1943 the federal government had a Department of 
Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which pursued 
criminal prosecutions against some government contractors. 
The Attorney General largely ignored the civil False Claims Act.32  
He usually did not file companion civil False Claims Act cases at the 
same time that criminal indictments were returned.  This delay gave rise 
to a growth industry in qui tam False Claims Act litigation.  A few 
enterprising citizens with knowledge of the False Claims Act would lurk 
in federal courthouses for criminal indictments to be brought against 
defense contractors then immediately file a civil False Claims Act case 
based on the indictment against the same contractor.  Such actions, 
known as “parasitic lawsuits,” infuriated the Attorney General Francis 
Biddle. 
 
 29. United States ex rel. Dowell v. Griswold, 30 F. 762, 763 (D. Or. 1887). 
 30. Id. 
 31. United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885).  This statement was later quoted 
with approval by the United States Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 
537, 541 n.5 (1943), and again in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 
949 (1997). 
 32. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
7
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It so happened that one such lawsuit made its way to the United 
States Supreme Court when an electrical contractor on a public works 
administrative project in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania was hit by a jury 
verdict from a qui tam suit.  The Supreme Court requested an amicus 
curiae brief from the United States.  General Biddle seized this 
opportunity to challenge the 1863 law. 
In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,33 the United States had 
indicted some electrical contractors for collusive bidding in a 
government project.  The defendants pled nolo contendere and were 
fined $54,000.  In the qui tam case arising from the same conduct, the 
relators—after a lengthy trial—obtained a verdict for $315,000.  Thus, it 
appears the qui tam provisions worked exactly as contemplated by 
Congress: the relators who bore the entire risk of the civil action 
obtained a net recovery for the United States of $150,000, some three 
times the amount of fines the Department of Justice had recovered in the 
criminal case. 
Despite the effectiveness of the qui tam provisions in the Marcus 
case, General Biddle used the amicus curiae opportunity to challenge the 
qui tam provisions.  He told the Supreme Court that qui tam actions 
should be eliminated because effective law enforcement required that 
control of litigation involving the United States should be left to the sole 
discretion of the Attorney General.  And despite the civil recovery in 
Marcus, General Biddle argued that qui tam actions might hurt the war 
effort.34 
The Supreme Court rejected General Biddle’s arguments as policy 
matters appropriately addressed to and dealt with by the Congress.  The 
Court unanimously upheld the relators’ verdict.35 
Qui tam suits have been frequently permitted by legislative action, and 
have not been without defense by the courts . . . Congress has power to 
choose this method to protect the Government from burdens fraudulently 
imposed on it; to nullify the . . . statute because of the dislike of the 
independent informer sections would be to exercise a veto power which is 
not ours.  Sound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover and not 
to direct the Congressional will.36 
So General Biddle’s attack on the qui tam provisions of the False Claims 
Act shifted to another front—he sought legislative action to abolish 
totally the qui tam provisions.  He went to Congress and cited the 
 
 33. 317 U.S. at 537. 
 34. Id. at 546–47. 
 35. Id. at 547, 552–53. 
 36. United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1155 (2d. 
Cir. 1993) (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541–42 (1943)), cert. denied, 508 
U.S. 973 (1993). 
8
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Marcus ruling and pointed to nineteen other pending qui tam actions as 
warranting repeal of the False Claims Act’s qui tam components. 
The House of Representatives hastened to do General Biddle’s 
bidding.  On April Fools Day, 1943, with only twenty-three members 
present, the House passed a resolution to amend the False Claims Act by 
abolishing all qui tam actions.37  No debates were held and no witnesses 
were called.38 
But the 1943 efforts to kill qui tam met strong resistance in the United 
States Senate.39  Hearings were held and at least one qui tam relator, 
Gordon Coates, testified against repeal of the qui tam provisions.40   
 
 37. 89 Cong. Rec. 7570, 7571 (1943).  One Congressman referred to the practice of filing qui 
tam cases based on information developed by the governments as a “racket.”  89 Cong. Rec. 7578 
(1943) (statement of Rep. Walter).  When the Senate refused to repeal the qui tam provisions and sent 
the House a revised bill, members of the House squabbled over whether the real “shysters” were the 
lawyers who brought the qui tam cases or the defense contractors who cheated the government.  See 89 
Cong. Rec. 10849 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1943). 
 38. 89 Cong. Rec. 7578 (1943) (statement of Sen. Langer).  After the Senate rejected the attempt 
by the House to repeal the qui tam provisions, the House did have a rather heated discussion between 
Representative Walter who complained of parasitic lawsuits and Representative Miller who believed the 
disclosure of fraud should be encouraged and financially incentivized.  Miller quoted Abraham Lincoln: 
Worse than traitors in arms are the men who pretend loyalty to the flag, feast and fatten 
on the misfortunes of the Nation while patriotic blood is crimsoning the plains of the 
South and their countrymen are mouldering in the dust.  The leniency of the Government 
towards these men is a marvel which the present cannot appreciate and history never 
explain. 
The author has been unable to find a contemporaneous citation for the quote ascribed to Lincoln.  
Rather, the quote seems to be from a report by the House Select Committee on Government Contracts 
on Mar. 3, 1863 (the day after Lincoln signed the False Claims Act).  See 3 GUSTAVUS MYER, HISTORY 
OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES (1910). 
 39. Interestingly, the year before in 1942, based on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F. 2d 233 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), the 
Senate had passed legislation repealing the qui tam provisions with little debate at the close of the 77th 
Congress. 88 Cong. Rec. 9138 (1942) (discussing S.2707).  After the Supreme Court reversed the Third 
Circuit decision opposition to the repeal developed in the Senate. 
 40. Gordon Coates’ experience as a qui tam relator and a witness before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee demonstrates the ever-present danger of being a whistleblower.  Mr. Coates’ family business 
was low bidder on building materials for a war ordnance plant in St. Louis, Missouri.  The Coates’ 
company was originally awarded the contract, but was displaced after making its first shipment when 
the contract was awarded to another contractor associated with former Kansas City political boss Tom 
Pendergast.  The other contractor submitted a bid fourteen days beyond the bid deadline for $100,000.00 
more.  89 Cong. Rec. 10698 (1943) (remarks of Sen. Langer).  After the new contractor failed to deliver 
timely and delayed completion of the plant, Coates disclosed this information to the Attorney General.  
For nine months, Mr. Coates requested, in vain, that the DOJ pursue the matter.  Consequently, Mr. 
Coates brought a qui tam action.  Thereafter, Mr. Coates appeared before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee while it was deliberating the proposed amendments.  He was assured by Assistant Attorney 
General Tom Clark that he could prosecute his case to conclusion.  Before the year was out, 
Representative Costello, the chairman of an investigating committee of the House Military Affairs 
Committee, requested Mr. Coates’ Selective Service file for a review of his draft classification.  Mr. 
Coates (who enjoyed a draft deferment classification as a producer of vital products for the war effort) 
was then reclassified to 1-A.  See 89 Cong. Rec. 7572 (1943) (statement of Sen. Van Nuys); see also, 89 
Cong. Rec. 10698–99 (1943) (remarks of Sen. Langer).  Representative Miller, the Congressman from 
9
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The Senate debate focused on what deference should be provided to 
the Attorney General.  It was pointed out that between 1863 and 1942 
the Attorney General had never brought a civil False Claims Act 
action.41  In addition to the Coates case, the Senate considered a scandal 
involving the Democratic National Committee Chairman who had in 
1935 been prosecuted by the Attorney General for overcharging the 
government on a public works project but who avoided conviction.  A 
rare government civil suit for $1.2 million was dismissed on statute of 
limitation grounds.42  The Senate considered language that would have 
permitted a qui tam case to be pursued only if the Attorney General had 
failed to act on information giving rise to the suit for 6 months.43  But 
such language was rejected.   
The eventual Senate version, which was adopted by the House and 
enacted into law by President Franklin Roosevelt’s signature on 
December 23, 194344 destroyed qui tam as an effective fraud-fighting 
tool.  The 1943 amendments to the False Claims Act eliminated the 
guaranteed 50% bounty to the successful relator.  But, more importantly, 
they also in practical affect eliminated not only so-called “parasitic 
lawsuits” but all qui tam cases.  If the Government possessed any 
knowledge of the fraud at the time the action was filed, then the qui tam 
suit had to be dismissed.45  Since someone in the Government could 
always be found who knew something of the fraud, this single change 
effectively eliminated qui tam cases for the next forty years. 
The 1943 Amendments also required the relator to provide all 
evidence he had to the government at the time the action was filed46 and 
 
Coates’ district, caused the Congressional Record to publish a letter from Coates complaining of what 
Coates referred to as “gestapo methods” by the Congress to repeal the Lincoln Law and have his case 
thrown out of Court.  See 89 Cong. Rec. 10848 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1943).  Whether Mr. Coates then 
became a user of war materials rather than a producer of war materials is not clear.  It appears he did file 
a False Claims Act case, which applied the 1943 amendments.  United States ex rel. Coates v. St. Louis 
Clay Products Co., 65 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mo. 1946). 
 41. 89 Cong. Rec. 10697 (1943). 
 42. 89 Cong. Rec. 7442, 7577, and 10746–47 (1943).  Fortunately for the United States, a so-
called “parasitic” qui tam suit had been filed before the statute of limitations expired which the Attorney 
General settled for $225,000.  United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 110 F. Supp. 175, 182 (D.N.J. 
1953), aff’d 210 F.2d 257, 259 n.1 (3d Cir. 1954) (The DOJ had later intervened in the case pursuant to 
the 1943 Amendments). 
 43. 89 Cong. Rec. 7598 (1943). 
 44. Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608 (1943). 
 45. 31 U.S.C. § 232(c) (1943). 
 46. Id.  If the relator provided his information to the government before he filed suit, then the 
government had knowledge of the fraud and the case had to be dismissed.  Such an event happened in 
United States ex rel. Wis. Dept. of Health & Servs. v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984); Safir v. 
Blackwell, 579 F.2d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979); Pettis ex rel. United 
States v. Morrison–Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d 668, 669 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Aster, 275 F.2d 
281, 283 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960); United States ex rel. Lapin v. Int’l Bus. 
Machs. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 244, 246 (D. Haw. 1980). 
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then gave the United States sixty days to elect whether it would 
prosecute the case.47  If the government so elected, then the relator 
became merely an observer.  If the government elected not to proceed, 
the relator could do so at his own expense.  The 1863 version’s 50% 
guarantee of the recovery to the successful relator was reduced to no 
more than 10% if the government elected to proceed,48 or no more than 
25% if the government allowed the relator to handle the case.49  The 
Court was provided absolute discretion to set the amount of the share 
below those numbers including to award the relator nothing. 
Congressman Miller from Mr. Coates district, prophetically warned 
that the 1943 amendments were an “infamous conspiracy, this subtle 
scheme to set aside the only guaranty that has lasted for 80 years against 
unmitigated frauds perpetrated upon the government and to substitute in 
its stead a feeble statute that does nothing but paralyze the efforts of an 
honest informer.”50 
Feeble indeed.  The 1943 amendments stood the False Claims Act on 
its head.  Instead of the private citizen controlling the civil action against 
the contractor, the Government now assumed total control over the 
lawsuit.  The qui tam suits that were brought were quickly dismissed on 
the Government’s motion raising the “any government knowledge” 
defense.  Qui tam virtually disappeared from the legal landscape. 
IV. THE 1986 AMENDMENTS TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: THE RETURN OF 
THE PRIVATEERS 
But fraud against the government did not disappear.  Once again, it 
was the defense industry that was the catalyst for invigorating the False 
Claims Act. 
In the 1980’s, President Reagan committed to a plan of enormous 
national defense spending.  The Soviet Union was unable to match such 
expenditures and virtually went bankrupt trying.  The vast sums being 
spent by the Department of Defense presented opportunities to cheat the 
Government, which proved irresistible to many. 
As had happened during the Civil War, the Congress again began 
receiving alarming reports of fraud, waste, and abuse:  
• $400 for hammers and $7,000 for coffee pots for the NAVY.51 
• $660 for ashtrays and $400 for socket wrenches to the NAVY.52 
 
 47. 31 U.S.C. § 232(c) (1943). 
 48. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(1) (1943). 
 49. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(2) (1943). 
 50. 89 Cong. Rec. 10848 (1943). 
 51. 131 Cong. Rec. 17818 (1985). 
 52. Bill Keller, Navy Pays $660 Apiece for Two Ashtrays, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1985, at A-14. 
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• $16,571 for a three-cubic-foot refrigerator for NAVY air crew 
lunches.53 
• $640 for NAVY aircraft toilet seats.54 
Complaints of profit gouging by the defense industries were made by 
Secretary of the Air Force, Verne Orr,55 by the Secretary of the NAVY, 
John Lehman,56 and by the Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger.57 
Recall that the 1943 amendments to the False Claims Act had been 
passed largely on the unsupported assumption that the Attorney General 
and Department of Justice were able and willing to do an adequate job 
of prosecuting fraud against the public treasury.  Unlike the 1943 
Congress, both chambers of the 1985–86 Congress held extensive 
hearings and considered much factual analysis to determine how best to 
protect public funds.  The analysis demonstrated that while the DOJ was 
prosecuting some fraud cases, it was simply being overwhelmed by the 
level of fraud against the taxpayers.  By 1985, four of the largest defense 
contractors (General Electric, Rockwell, GTE and Gould) had been 
convicted of criminal fraud offenses.  Another major defense contractor, 
General Dynamics, had been indicted for fraud.  And forty-five of the 
100 largest defense contractors were under investigation for multiple 
fraud offenses.58  Fraud against the Government was on the rise.59   
And as difficult and unusual as detecting fraud was, prosecution and 
recovery was even rarer.  As found by the United States General 
Accounting Office: “For those who are caught committing fraud, the 
chances of being prosecuted and eventually going to jail are 
slim . . . .  The sad truth is that crime against the Government often does 
pay.”60 
As it turns out, at the same time Congress was digesting this alarming 
 
 53. Fred Hiatt, Now, the $600 Toilet Seat, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 5, 1985, at A5. 
 54. Id.  Based on a deposition taken in United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 196 
F.R.D. 310 (S.D. Ohio 2000) by the author’s partner, Paul B. Martins, it appears the same NAVY 
admiral was responsible for all or most of these purchases. 
 55. Richard Halloran, Contractor Penalties Harsher, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1985, at D4. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Navy Investigating Bills for $660 Ashtrays, $400 Wrenches, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS 
ARCHIVE (May 28, 1985), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1985/Navy-Investigating-Bills-For-$660-
Ashtrays-$400-Wrenches/id-24fa49472f8896be342ea5fac09c8a4a. 
 58. Sen. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2–3 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267. 
 59. H.R. Rep. No. 99-660, at 18 (1986); see also S. Rep. No. 99-345, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266 (Department of Defense Fraud investigations rose 30% between 1982 and 1984).  
From 1983 to 1986 the Department of Health and Human Services tripled its prosecution referrals for 
fraud.  H.R. Rep. No. 99-660, at 18 (1986).  During the same time frame the United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO) identified over 77,000 fraud cases.  S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 3, reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5268. 
 60. GAO Report to Congress, “Fraud in Government Programs: How Extensive Is It?  How can 
it be Controlled?”  (1981) quoted in S. Rep. No. 99-345 at 3, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5268 (emphasis in 
original). 
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information there was a single qui tam case pending in the United States 
in Cincinnati, Ohio.  The author had brought a qui tam suit in 1984 
against the General Electric Company for mischarging labor vouchers.  
General Electric performed work on fixed-price commercial aircraft 
engines and then charged the work to identical cost-plus-profit engines 
being constructed for the recently configured B-1B “Lancer” bomber.  
The author had rediscovered the False Claims Act buried in the banking 
regulations of the United States Code in attempting to fashion a remedy 
for a General Electric machinist foreman who had been fired for 
refusing to falsify the time cards in his department to overcharge the 
taxpayers as requested by his superiors.61  When Congress became 
aware of this lawsuit, both the author and his client were subpoenaed to 
present testimony before the United States Senate and the House of 
Representatives on how to amend the False Claims Act to make it an 
effective fraud fighting device.62  While Congress heard other testimony, 
ours was the only evidence from anyone who had faced the hurdles of 
the 1943 Amendments, or had a qui tam case pending, or had ever 
brought a qui tam case.  Eventually, every recommendation we made 
was adopted.  President Reagan signed the 1986 False Claims Act 
amendments into law on October 27, 1986. 
The 1986 amendments recognize that the magnitude of the fraud 
problem is such that a solid partnership needs to be forged between 
government prosecutors and private whistleblowers and their counsel.  
To that end, the 1986 amendments encourage, incentivize, and protect 
relators in numerous ways.  While the guaranteed 50% of any recovery 
from the 1863 version was not reinstated, the 1986 amendments did alter 
the miserly rewards of the 1943 amendments.  Now the successful 
relator receives between 15 to 25% of the recovery if the United States 
prosecuted the case and 25 to 30% if the relator handles the case without 
government intervention.63  The United States recovery (and thus the 
sum from which the relator share percentages is calculated) was 
increased from double to treble damages.64  The penalties per each false 
claim were increased for the first time since the 1863 version of $2,000 
 
 61. James B. Helmer Jr. & Robert C. Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions 
of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their Application to the 
United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Elec. Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 35 (1991). 
 62. False Claims Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1562 Before the Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 49–61 (1985) (statements of John 
M. Gravitt and James B. Helmer, Jr., Esq.); False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong. 
339–92 (1986) (statements of John M. Gravitt and James B. Helmer, Jr., Esq.). 
 63. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) and (2) (1986).  For exceptions to these percentages, see James B. 
Helmer, Jr., How Great is Thy Bounty: Relator’s Share Calculations Pursuant to the False Claims Act, 
68 U. CIN . L. REV. 737, 750, 755 (2000). 
 64. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1986). 
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to now $5,000 to $10,000 per false claim.65  For the first time, the 
successful relator’s attorney fees and expenses became recoverable from 
the contractor66 and relators were provided with protection from 
retaliation in their employment.67 
Other substantial changes include the relator’s right to continued 
participation in the litigation even if the United States elects to prosecute 
the case itself,68 a clarification of the degree of intent required to 
establish a False Claims Act violation,69 and setting forth a civil 
standard for the burden of proof.70 
Perhaps the most significant change in 1986 was the elimination of 
the “any prior government knowledge” defense, which in the 1943 
amendments led to the dismissal of any suit in which some government 
official could be found who knew something about the fraud.  In its 
place was added a “public disclosure” exception designed to prevent 
parasitic lawsuits.  This provision bars any qui tam case which is based 
on a prior public disclosure of the allegations by the media or a criminal, 
civil or administrative hearing unless the relator is an “original source” 
with direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the 
allegations are based and who voluntarily provided such information to 
the government before filing suit.71  The public disclosure/original 
source exception would become the most litigated provision of the 1986 
False Claims Act, second only to the ever present defense challenge that 
a relator’s complaint did not possess sufficient particularity to satisfy 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).72 
 
 65. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1986).  In accord with Section 5 of the Federal Monetary Penalties 
Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-410, these penalties are now adjusted to not less than 
$5,500 and not more than $11,000 per false claim occurring after Sept. 29, 1999.  28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) 
(2002); Cook County, Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 123 n.1 (2003).  Had the 
original $2,000 per false claim penalty been adjusted for inflation since 1863, the amount of the penalty 
today would be a whopping $18,000 per false claim.  H. Rep. No. 99-660, at 17 (1988). 
 66. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) and (2) (1986). 
 67. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1986). 
 68. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c). 
 69. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1986).  This provision resolved a circuit court split.  Compare United 
States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 286–87 (7th Cir. 1978) (no specific intent to defraud required), with 
United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 122–23 (9th Cir. 1970) (requiring specific intent to defraud). 
 70. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c).  The burden of proof is the simple preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  Previously, various courts had determined the burden to range from civil preponderance all of 
the way to beyond a reasonable doubt.  Compare Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 727 
(8th Cir. 1985) (“preponderance of the evidence”),with United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 315 (6th 
Cir. 1962) (“clear and convincing”), and Hageny v. United States, 570 F.2d 924, 933 (Ct. Cl. 1978) 
(“clear and convincing”), and United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1893) (“beyond a 
reasonable doubt”). 
 71. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (1986). 
 72. There was also an amendment to the False Claims Act in 1988 that was intended to eliminate 
a guaranteed share of the recovery in a qui tam action where the relator was the “principal architect” of a 
scheme to defraud the government.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (1988).  For the “super rogue” who is 
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) supported the 1986 amendments for 
the increased damages and penalties and the clarification of the intent 
standard and burden of proof.  But the DOJ opposed any other 
amendment to the qui tam provisions, asserting similar arguments to 
what it had presented in 1943: the government did not need any help.73  
The primary sponsor of the Senate version of the 1986 amendments 
chastised both the DOJ and Department of Defense as having “chosen to 
satisfy their obsession with looking good, rather than deal forthrightly 
with a clear and growing danger.”74 
Most of the Congress agreed.  The 1986 amendments were enacted 
not only to encourage whistleblowers and to protect their financial stake 
in qui tam actions but also to act “as a check that the Government does 
not neglect evidence, cause undu[e] delay, or drop the False Claims case 
without legitimate reason.”75  President Reagan signed the Amendments 
into law on October 27, 1986.76 
The DOJ’s antagonism toward qui tam cases did not end with the 
enactment of the 1986 Amendments.  For 9 years after the passage of 
the 1986 amendments the DOJ refused to defend the constitutionality of 
the False Claims Act qui tam provisions, even when requested to do so 
by various federal judges.  Instead that role was left to the private bar.  
The privateers achieved an undefeated record without DOJ help in 
defending the amendments from a plethora of constitutional 
challenges.77 
The 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act revitalized qui tam 
cases.  Nearly 8,000 have been filed and over $3 billion of stolen 
taxpayer dollars recovered.78  In contrast, in 1985, the year before the 
 
convicted of criminal conduct for his role in the fraudulent conduct at issue there is to be no share.  This 
amendment is not to apply to those whose role in the false claims conduct is minor.  134 Cong. Rec. 
S16704–05 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 73. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 36 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5301 (letter from 
Phillip Brady, acting Assistant Attorney General); H.R. Rep. No. 99-660, at 64 (1986) (letter from John 
Bolton, Assistant Attorney General).  The DOJ’s stance was at odds with the statements from its own 
Economic Crime Council that defense procurement fraud prosecution was inadequate.  See 132 Cong. 
Rec. 20535 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 74. How to Deter Future Fraud and Corruption In National Defense Procurement: Hearings on 
S. 588 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1–2 (1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 75. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5291. 
 76. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33) (1994). 
 77. For a description of all the various constitutional challenges, see HELMER, supra note 3, at 
ch. 4. 
 78. Taxpayers Against Fraud is the best source for recovery statistics.  Fraud Statistics-overview, 
TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, http://www.taf.org/FCA-stats-2010.pdf.  While the DOJ keeps statistics 
and reports to Congress it has always under reported the effects of qui tam cases.  For example, the DOJ 
does not include in its statistics the billions of dollars recovered due to qui tam filed cases for criminal 
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enactment of the 1986 amendments, the entire Department of Justice 
infrastructure managed to recover a measly $54 million under the False 
Claims Act.79 
There is an adage in life that friends come and go but enemies 
accumulate.  As if the Department of Justice as an enemy of qui tam 
cases was not enough, the smashing recoveries under the 1986 
amendments led to the accumulation of other skillful opponents.  Most 
of the major defense contractors banded together to form something 
called the Defense Industry Initiative in an unsuccessful attempt to 
lobby Congress to abrogate qui tam cases in return for the defense 
contractors self-policing themselves.80  The American Hospital 
Association also unsuccessfully lobbied Congress to rewrite the False 
Claims Act for violations involving health care programs.81  And the 
United States Chamber of Commerce has thrown its influence as 
America’s protector of business to fight every effort by the various 
states to implement their own False Claims Act.82 
In addition, a large bar of defense lawyers has been attracted by the 
hundreds of millions of dollars expended by government contractors 
attempting to extricate themselves from False Claims Act liability.  This 
defense bar has challenged every provision and nearly each of the 3,000 
or so words of the False Claims Act.  There are now thousands of 
 
fines and dollars earmarked to be returned to various states.  For other examples of why DOJ’s statistics 
are faulty and misleading, see HELMER, supra note 3, at ch. 21, § II(D).  Current statistics from the DOJ 
are available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf.  Such 
statistics are criticized at DOJ Hides its Light Under a Barrel, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, 
TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, http://taf.org/blog/doj-hides-its-light-under-barrel (last 
visited May 24, 2013). 
 79. S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 6 (2008). 
 80. According to its website, the Defense Industry Initiative was formed after President Reagan’s 
“Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management” excoriated the defense industry’s integrity in the 
acquisition process, some thirty-two major defense contractors pledged to adopt certain core principles 
of conduct, including encouraging internal reporting of violations of self-imposed conduct codes.  The 
organization now claims eighty-two member companies.  See DEFENSE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE 
http://www.dii.org/about-us (last visited May 24, 2013). 
 81. See HELMER, supra note 3, at ch. 21, § II(F).  For examples of American Hospital 
Association’s efforts to water down the qui tam provisions, see correspondence at 
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2008/080618-let-fca-coalition-house.pdf and http://www.aha. 
org/advocacy-issues/letter-2009/090421-fca-Rep-ltr.pdf.  For examples of the dozens of amicus curiae 
briefs filed by the American Hospital Association against qui tam cases see Legal Resources: Amicus 
Briefs, AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2009/090421-FCA-Rep-ltr.pdf 
(last visited May 24, 2013). 
 82. The Chamber continues to enjoy some success in convincing state legislators to oppose state 
versions of the False Claims Act, including in Ohio.  But most states have recognized the public policy 
benefits of the False Claims Act and the incentive enacted by the federal Congress to allow states that 
have enacted False Claims Act to keep a higher percentage of the dollars recovered in federal 
medicaid/medicare cases.  To date thirty-one states, the District of Columbia, and some major cities 
such as New York have enacted their own versions of the False Claims Act.  See HELMER, supra note 3, 
at ch. 22. 
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published decisions on the 1986 amendments.  Many of those decisions 
misinterpreted what Congress was trying to do.  Congress finally had 
had enough.  In 2008 it began the process of major clarifications to the 
False Claims Act. 
V. CONGRESS IS SPURRED TO ACTION WHEN ALLISON ENGINE THROWS A 
ROD INTO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
With thousands of published judicial decisions on the 1986 
amendments it is foreseeable that some decisions would be at cross-
purposes with what Congress is trying to do.83  The final straw, which 
triggered Congressional action, was the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, another 
Cincinnati qui tam case.84 
In Sanders a trial judge improperly added language to the second 
liability provision85 of the False Claims Act, imposing a “presentment to 
the government” requirement.  As a result, he then granted a judgment 
for several defense subcontractors after a five-week jury trial.86  The 
evidence demonstrated that the subcontractors knowingly had failed to 
follow precise NAVY specifications while building the electrical 
generator power units for the Arleigh Burke class destroyers.87  The 
 
 83. As the legislative history indicates: 
The effectiveness of the FCA has recently been undermined by court decisions limiting 
the scope of the law and allowing subcontractors and non-governmental entities to 
escape responsibility for proven frauds.  In order to respond to these decisions, certain 
provisions of the FCA must be corrected and clarified in order to protect the Federal 
assistance and relief funds expended in response to our economic crisis. 
Sen. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009).  “However, over the two decades since legislation last addresses the 
False Claims Act, court decisions have created a complex patchwork of procedural and jurisdictional 
hurdles that have often derailed meritorious actions and discouraged private citizens from filing qui tam 
actions.”  H.R. Rep. No. 111-97, at 2 (2009). 
 84. 553 U.S. 662 (2008); S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 10 (2009) (“This section amends the FCA to 
clarify and correct erroneous interpretations of the law that were decided in Allison Engine Co. v. United 
States ex rel. Sanders . . . .”); H.R. Rep. No. 111-97, at 5–6 (2009) (“More recently, in 2008, the 
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must prove that the defendant intended for its false statements to 
cause the Federal Government itself to rely on the false statements as a condition of payment.”) (citing 
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008)).  The author has been trial 
counsel for the Sanders relators for eighteen years and argued the case before the Supreme Court.  See 
James B. Helmer Jr., Supreme Effort: One Lawyer’s Odyssey to the United States Supreme Court in a 
False Claims Act Case, 49 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 193 (2008). 
 85. “Any person who . . . (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record 
or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government . . . is liable to the 
United States Government . . . .”  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (1986). 
 86. The trial court followed an opinion by then Judge John Roberts while he was serving on the 
D.C. Court of Appeals.  United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 492 (D.C. Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1032 (2005), rev’d by, Allison Engine Co., 553 U.S. 662 (2008). 
 87. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610, 623 n.7 (6th Cir. 2006), 
reh’g en banc denied, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 10114 (6th Cir. Apr. 20, 2007). 
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relators submitted all of the subcontractors’ invoices into evidence but 
neither sued the prime contractor shipyards nor submitted the shipyards’ 
invoices to the NAVY as evidence.  The trial court ruled that 
“presentment to the government” of the invoices of the non-defendants 
was a requirement of the False Claims Act. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed 
that the word “presentment” should be added to the second liability 
provision of the False Claims Act and reversed the trial court.88 
The United States Supreme Court, with John Roberts now serving as 
Chief Justice of the United States, ruled unanimously that the Sixth 
Circuit was correct that “presentment” was not an element of the second 
liability provision.  But the Court went beyond the issue upon which it 
had granted certiorari and then found that the words “to get” in the 
second liability provision were meant by Congress to require that a 
subcontractor must have intended by its conduct to obtain federal 
money.89  The Court then vacated the Sixth Circuit’s opinion and the 
case was remanded to the original trial court to apply this heretofore 
unknown standard to the case. 
The Sanders decision immediately became the focus of Congressional 
scrutiny.  As a Senate Committee found:  
In Allison Engine, the Court held that the FCA contained an intent 
requirement in sections 3729 (a)(2) and (a)(3) that had not previously 
been required to prove for FCA liability to attach.  The Allison Engine 
decision created a significant question about the scope and applicability 
of the FCA to certain false claims, effectively limiting FCA coverage for 
some Government programs and funds.  As a result, defendants across the 
country have cited Allison Engine in seeking dismissal of certain FCA 
claims that the FCA no longer applies to Government programs 
traditionally covered.90 
The author was again called to testify about the Supreme Court’s ruling 
as well as about other suggestions to clarify the 1986 language.91 
In a showing of rare and remarkable bi-partisanship, Congress 
overwhelming enacted a series of amendments to the False Claims Act 
that set aside several judicial decisions—including the Supreme Court’s 
Allison Engine ruling.92  These amendments were all signed by President 
 
 88. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610. 
 89. Allison Engine Co., 553 U.S. 662.  A detailed description of the decision can be found at 
HELMER, supra note 3, at ch. 33, § III(F). 
 90. S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 11–12 (2009). 
 91. H.R. 4854 the “False Claims Correction Act”: Joint hearing Before Both the H. Subcomm. 
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property and the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law, 110th Cong., 1–179 (June 19, 2008) (testimony of James B. Helmer, Jr.), available 
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Helmer080619.pdf. 
 92. Fully 86% of the House of Representatives voted to override the Supreme Court’s new 
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Obama and were spread over three statutes. 
In the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (known as FERA)93 the 
“to get” language the Supreme Court had relied upon in Allison Engine 
to arrive at a heretofore unknown intent requirement was stricken.94  
Congress further amended the definition of “claim” to mean any demand 
for money or property if it is to be spent or used on behalf of the 
Government or to advance a Government program on interest.95  The 
second liability clause now makes any person liable who makes or uses 
a false statement material to a false claim—that is, having a natural 
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing payment.96  
Furthermore, the whistleblower protection clause was modified to cover 
acts done not just by an employee but also a contractor, agent, or 
associated others in furtherance of a False Claims Act action.97  The 
statute of limitations for any complaint submitted by the Government is 
to relate back to the original filing date of the relator if the 
Government’s claims arise out of the conduct or transaction, set forth in 
any prior complaint.98  Finally, the False Claims Act now provides that 
the seal provision of the Act does not prohibit service of the complaint 
on any state or local government named as a co-plaintiff.99  The 
Attorney General may designate someone else to issue a civil 
investigative demand and may share the information obtained from such 
demand with the relator.100 
Next, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act101 addressed the 
chaos that had arisen surrounding the public disclosure/original source 
provisions.  These provisions, enacted in 1986 to replace the “any 
government knowledge” defense and to deal with parasitic qui tam 
actions, had been so wildly interpreted by the courts that a four-way 
split in the Circuit Courts existed.  To bring some sanity to the area the 
provisions were rewritten to clarify that only a public disclosure by a 
federal hearing or report or from the news media could deprive the court 
of jurisdiction over the case.102  Even such disclosures could be over-
ridden if the Government opposed a motion to dismiss on such public 
 
interpretation of the Act (367 to 59).  155 Cong. Rec. H5689 (daily ed. May 18, 2009).  The Senate vote 
was not even that close (92 to 4).  155 Cong. Rec. S4776–77 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2009). 
 93. Pub. L. No. 111-21 § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25 (2009). 
 94. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2009). 
 95. See id. § 3729(b)(2). 
 96. See id. § 3729(b)(4). 
 97. See id. § 3730(h)(1). 
 98. See id. § 3731(c). 
 99. See id. § 3732(c). 
 100. See id. § 3733(a)(1). 
 101. Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901–02 (2010). 
 102. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i) (2010). 
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disclosure grounds.103  This change overruled another Supreme Court 
opinion that had determined that public disclosures in non-federal 
matters also could serve as a basis to revoke jurisdiction in a qui tam 
case.104 
Finally, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act105 overturned another Supreme Court ruling, this one 
concerning what the appropriate statute of limitations is for a 
whistleblower retaliation case.  The Supreme Court had left a sea of 
confusion in this area by ruling that the appropriate statute of limitations 
for a federal retaliation claim was to be determined by consulting a 
comparable statute in the state in which the retaliation occurred.106  
Congress clarified that the correct limitation period for all retaliation 
cases would be three years after the date of the retaliation.107 
Not surprisingly, the Obama amendments have already spurred a new 
round of judicial challenges as defense counsel probe all of the language 
searching for ways to derail qui tam cases.  One of the first such major 
challenges arose in the remanded Sanders case which had led to the 
amendments in the first place. 
To ensure that the Supreme Court decision in Sanders did not impact 
any cases, Congress specifically provided in FERA that the effective 
date of the changes to the second liability provision, i.e., the elimination 
of the “to get” language, would be June 7, 2008—2 days before the 
Supreme Court’s Sanders decision—and apply to “all claims under the 
False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.) that are pending on or after 
that date.”  It seems clear enough from the reports of both the House and 
Senate that nullifying the Supreme Court’s newly discovered intent 
standard was at the top of the list of Congress’s clarification 
amendments.108 
But the same trial court which had added the word “presentment” in 
2005 to the 1986 version of the False Claims Act, now attempted to 
rewrite the 2009 amendments.  First, the trial court subtracted the words 
“under the False Claims Act” from the retroactivity provision.  Then the 
trial court added the words “for payment” after “claims” in place of the 
phrase “under the False Claims Act.”  This led the Court to conclude 
that the amendments did not apply to the very case which was their 
 
 103. See id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
 104. Graham Co. Soil & Water Conserv. District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 
1411 (2010). 
 105. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1079A(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2077 (2010). 
 106. Graham Co. Soil & Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 414 
(2005). 
 107. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(3) (2010). 
 108. See supra note 79. 
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genesis because no claims for payment in the eighteen year-old case 
were still pending on June 7, 2008.  Furthermore, the trial court ruled 
that it would be an unconstitutional violation of the ex post facto clause 
to apply the FERA amendments to the Allison Engine case.109 
Once again the case ambled to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit.110  The same panel that had previously reversed the 
trial court was assigned and again reversed the trial judge.  The Court of 
Appeals determined that both the statutory construction finding as well 
as the constitutional ruling by the trial court were wrong.  As a result, 
the Court determined that the retroactivity language of FERA applies to 
all civil actions pending as of June 7, 2008 and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.111  The same issue has been addressed, though not 
with the same detailed analysis as performed by the Sixth Circuit, by 
several other courts.112 
Thus, just as occurred after the passage of the 1986 Amendments, 
there will be a period of time when the constitutionality of the 2009–10 
amendments, beginning with retroactivity,113 are challenged.  The debate 
over the False Claims Act will then move to the statutory language 
itself.  Because of the vast amounts of money at stake in qui tam cases 
we can expect the courts to remain busy for some time. 
The False Claims Act and its modifications have been signed by 
Presidents Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, and 
Barack Obama.  The American Defense Industry is largely responsible 
for where this Statute has been and what it has become.  Now, however, 
massive fraud against the Medicare system has overshadowed defense 
cases brought pursuant to the False Claims Act.114 
It is clear that the underlying premise of the False Claims Act of 
enlisting the public to assist their government in combating fraud by 
 
 109. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 667 F. Supp.2d 747 (S.D. Ohio 2009), 
rev’d, 703 F.3d 930 (6th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26758 (6th Cir. Dec. 
5, 2012), cert. denied, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4850 (June 24, 2013). 
 110. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals granted the motions of the relator and the United 
States to certify the matter for an interlocutory appeal.  In re Sanders, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 27431 
(6th Cir. July 2, 2010). 
 111. Sanders and United States v. Allison Engine Co., 703 F.3d 930 (6th Cir. 2012), reh’g en 
banc denied, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26758 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 2012), cert. denied, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4850 (June 24, 2013). 
 112. See Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 689 F.3d 470, n.4 (5th Cir. 2012); United 
States ex rel. Yannacoupolos v. General Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818, 822 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011); United States 
ex rel. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011); United 
States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. 
Kirk v. Elevator Corp., 601 F.3d 94, 113 (2d Cir. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1885 (2011); 
Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 113. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997). 
 114. S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 7 (2008) (Healthcare cases have accounted for approximately 40% of 
the False Claims Act recoveries). 
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incentivizing such activity with potentially large rewards has proven 
wildly successfully.  We should not expect Congress to remove this 
technique in the near future despite the cries of less-than-scrupulous 
government contractors that the sky is falling. 
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